Abstract: Rorty rejects the idea of a "permanent and neutral matrix of heuristic concepts". The claim of privilege, however, is separable from the aim of universality, and this idea can be transposed into a regulative ideal, while still preserving the unique intellectual mission of a discipline of philosophy. Rorty's own positive picture of "edifying philosophy" in contrast is arguably irresponsible and grounded in misreadings both of the epistemology of science and of episodes in the history of philosophy, especially the contributions of Kant.
Like many of my colleagues, I find much of what Professor Rorty
has to say about the state of philosophy in America today insightful and persuasive. Certainly it is difficult to argue with his observation that analytic philosophy in the Englishspeaking world today lacks the sort of comfortable unifying metaphilosophical self-image which thirty years ago it drew from canonical listings of "the leading problems of scientifc philosophy" and from the "secure matrix of heuristic concepts" taken for granted in the early days of logical positivism's first flowering. Like many of my colleagues, however, I am also disturbed by the full picture which Rorty paints of the current state of our discipline.
I would want to insist upon the word 'discipline' here. The truth of much of what Rorty says crucially turns upon his focusing his attention upon the notion of philosophy as a profession, a "Fach" -and it is indeed undeniable that many of the current members of the American Philosophical Association tend to think of themselves in those terms, as philosophers by profession. The self-conception which lay behind a newsletter entitled "Jobs in Philosophy" has unfortunately outlasted its salutory renaming as "Jobs for Philosophers", and so in America we still solicit our candidates for teaching positions by AOS (Area of Specialization) and AOC (Areas of Competence) -as if Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, Locke and Leibniz, Kant and Hegel, Mill and Peirce and Dewey, Wittgenstein, Strawson, and Sellars, or for that matter, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Gadamer, Habermas, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, and Foucoult could or should be sorted by AOS and AOC.
Unlike Rorty I do not find Sellars' "definition" of philosophy -as "seeing how things, in the largest sense of the term, hang Analyse & Kritik 4 (1982), S. 114-128 @ Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen My point is that the claim of privilege is separable from the aim of universality. We can, in other words, relinquish the claims to the "permanence" and "neutrality" of any "matrix of heuristic concepts" under which this or that individual philosopher, school, or philosophical movement has historically attempted to subsume, to understand, and to appraise diverse specific areas of human inquiry and concern without however at the same time abandoning the conviction that it is precisely the effort to construct and to apply such synoptic "matrices of heuristic concepts" which always has been, and still is, the proper business of the discipline of philosophy as such. On this view, the historically-important idea of a universal categorial framework which is privileged, permanent, and socioculturally neutral becomes transposed into a "regulative ideal". The enterprise which such an ideal de facto regulates, however, can remain untouched by this transposition. That is, it remains open to us to undertake the distinctively philosophical project of formulating a universal synoptic framework of integrative concepts and categories in terms of which our polymorphic languages, inquiries, and practices can be synthetically grasped and reflectively appraised, while simultaneously acknowledging that any actual categorial framework which we succeed in outlining will inevitably be timebound and historically contingent.
The crucial point upon which I wish to insist is that it no more follows from the ultimate contingency of such synoptic heuristic frameworks that their construction is pointless or valueless than it follows from the necessary defeasibility of explanatory theories projected within the natural sciences that they fail actually to explain the phenomena which fall within their scope. Just as we regard our currently-best explanatory theories as embodying our currently-best answers to questions regarding the objective content and lawful structure of physical reality, so, too, we can regard the systematic frameworks of concepts and categories outlined and applied by philosophers of synoptic intent precisely as embodying our currently-best solutions to "the great problems which have always troubled the human spirit". What I have elsewhere (Rosenberg 1980b, 191) called "the grand project of bringing our rational practices under rational survey" remains the legitimate coherent enterprise of an autonomous discipline of philosophy even after we have granted that the categories and concepts of such an intellectual self-knowledge and selfappraisal -of our collective cultural apperception, so to speak -may well themselves evolve and change as we ourselves evolve and change.
Although I am thus convinced that both the problem space and the distinctive intellectual mission of the discipline of philosophy as such have not in fact undergone any radical or discontinuous changes since their articulation by Socratescum-Plato, however, it is certainly undeniable that the specific points of focus within this synoptic space of human concerns which have served as the points of departure for historically significant philosophical research programs have varied dramatically across time. The "theological turn" inaugurated by the mediaeval Christian rediscovery of Aristotle, the "epistemological turn" initiated by Descartes, and the "linguistic turn" (or, perhaps better, the "logico-linguistic turn") executed at the outset of this century by Frege, Wittgenstein, Russell, and Moore are rightly recognized as major nexes of change -not, I would argue, in the way in which the aim of philosophical inquiry itself was globally and generically conceived, but in the tactical orientation from which this invariant synoptic enterprise came to be approached, the methodological and problematic perspective from which the overarching goal of a universal and integrative cultural self-understanding and self-criticism came to be pursued.
The "analytic" philosophy which Rorty charges with metaphilosophical directionlessness is a child of the latest of these tactical "turns". I use the word 'tactical' advisedly, for I intend, indeed, to recall the classical military distinction between tactics and strategy. The strategy of philosophical inquiry, I think, has not changed. It was at the beginning and it remains today what Plato called "dialectical" -in contrast, for instance, to being "observational", "experimental", or "poetic". By whatever name, philosophical practice has always been "a movement of the Logos", that is, a question of discursive reasoning. The business of philosophical inquiry has always been "argumentation" -not in the sense of "quarrelsomeness" but in the sense that the philosophical aim is not, so to speak, merely to express a synoptic vision of man-in-the-world but to advance a rational vision, that is, one which has a legitimate claim on our reasoned assent and which can be coherently sustained in the face of rational criticisms.
Stylistically, of course, philosophical discourse has spanned the range of literary possibilities. We have had the dramatic dialogues of Plato (and the less dramatic ones of Hume and Berkeley), the solipsistic meditations of Descartes and Husserl, the cramped exposition "more geometrico" of Spinoza's Ethics, dry Kantian architectonic, convoluted Hegelian dialectic, and the aphoristic mannerisms of Wittgenstein and, before him, Nietzsche. Currently, as Rorty points out, our collective "analytic" style inclines toward the "lawyerly". We tend, that is, to give our discursive reasonings the expository form of a legal brief.
I think that Rorty is right about this. Our customary expository idiom has, indeed, become more "legalistic" and "argumentative" than "literary" and "historical" (although not without significant exceptions). But we need only recall the "Disputatio" of the Scholastics to remind ourselves that this is hardly the first time that this has happened. What I think Rorty is wrong about, however, is his suggestion that this stylistic unity is now the only unity of analytic philosophy -that analytic philosophy today lacks any, even implicit, shared substantive metaphilosophical convictions.
As Rorty knows full well, such stylistic unity does not evolve in a vacuum, as it were, per accidens. If philosophers in England and America suddenly began at the turn of the century to sound ever less like men of letters and ever more like officers of the court, it is surely appropriate to ask why that should be so. What is the reason for this relatively abrupt shift in the style of expository philosophical prose? I want to suggest that the explanation lies precisely in the area of metaphilosophy. It is to be found, in fact, precisely in the collective (albeit often only implicit} acknowledgement by members of the Anglo-Arnerican philosophical community of certain metaphilosophical and methodological theses which are themselves, in turn, characteristic and even constitutive of the so-called "linguistic turn".
What is definitive of the "linguistic turn", I propose, is its decisive abandonment of the picture of language as a transparent medium for the transmission of thoughts. As Rorty himself notes:
"If there iS one thing we have learned about concepts in recent decades it is that to have a concept is to be able to use a word, that to have a mastery of concepts is to be able to use a language, and that languages are created rather than discovered." (Rorty 1981, 14) This remark, of course, is exactly on target -as far as it goes. But it need to be supplemented with the second crucial thesis of the "linguistic turn": Not only are things often not what they seem, words too are often not what they seem. That is, there is appearance and reality with respect to language itself.
This distinction between appearance and reality with respect to language appears in many guises. It first surfaced as a distinction between "grammatical form" and "logical form"; later, as a contrast between "surface grammar" and "depth grammer". In the Philosophical Investigations, it dramatically emerges in the tension between "the picture which holds us captive" (the picture which "lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably"} and "the language game which is actually played". Although variously baptized, however, the thesis that our languages themselves -not only the languages about which we philosophize, but, crucially, the very language in which we philosophize as well -can confuse, mislead, and not merely transmit but essentially embody error and illusion has been a pivotal commitment· of AngloArnerican metaphilosophy, explicitly or implicitly, since Frege paraphrased "all" in terms of "if" and Russell applied the therapy of "On Denoting" to Meinong's golden mountain.
It is, I suggest, in consequence of their commitment to this metaphilosophical thesis, what we might call the thesis of "Two Forms", that analytic philosophers, naturally enough, have come to be very fussy about the language in which their own discursive reasonings are expressed -much in the way that lawyers are inclined to be very fussy about the language in which their legal reasonings are expressed. In the aftermath of the reflective critiques of philosophical discourse mounted by Moore, Wittgenstein, and Austin during the first half of this century, in other words, the first order of business for analytic philosophy has become: "Making sense". "systematic philosophy", is not "to find objective truth". It is, simply, "to keep the conversation going".(377) An edifying philosopher is not a "Wissenschaftler", pursuing an in quiry into special subjects by special means, but rather a "conversational partner", whose business, so to speak, is not to hold and advocate views on subjects of cultural concern but instead to "attempt to prevent conversation from degenerating into inquiry, into an exchange of views." (372) Now there is much that is appealing about this picture of philosophical activity, not the least of which, I suspect, is the fact that it apparently removes from us the burdens of a certain intellectual responsibility. If the edifying philosopher neither holds and advocates views nor advances and defends theses, he is a fortiori relieved of the responsibility for producing cogent reasons in support of what he says. Given that the aim of edifying philosophy is simply "to keep the conversation going", the edifying philosopher will have a--chieved his goal once he has succeeded in saying something to which other participants in the conversation find themselves moved to react. It is not simply that the classical and positivistic ends of demonstration and proof come to be surrendered in favor of the less stringent rhetorical goals of convincing and persuading, for, if I read Rorty rightly, there is nothing of which an edifying philosopher per se wishes to convince or persuade his conversational partners. In his role as "informed dilettante", he has no view which he wishes them to espouse nor any thesis which he hopes they will adopt. There is, to be sure, something which an edifying philosopher wants his conversational partners to do -but it is only to "keep talking".
The conclusion seems warranted, in fact, that the most important talent which a philosopher of Rorty's "edifying" persuasion could possess would not be the "lawyerly" skill of cogent argumentation or the "literary" capacity to tell a moving story, but rather the ability more or less at will to say something provocative. And if he can say something which his conversational partners find absolutely outrageous, so much the better. The conversation will not only "keep going"; it is likely to become positively heated. (These virtues, of course, Rorty himself possesses in abundance. Witness his celebrated sympathetic account of Cardinal Bellarmine's stance in the disputes with Galileo over Copernican theory.)
What strikes me most about Rorty's picture of "edifying philosophy" is its apparent pointlessness. To put it another way, what I am inclined to say is that Rorty has failed to distinguish between our culture's being thought of as a series of ongoing conversations and its being thought of as a series of ongoing chats. The ·virtue of a chat is, indeed, to "keep going". It is those awkward silences which one wishes above all to avoid. A conversation, in contrast, is about something. It has a point, a theme or a topic. It is not just "going" but -or so we hope -going somewhere. In a chat, "changing the subject" is often a mark of social grace. In a conversation, however, it is not just impolite: it is precisely obstructive. A conversation has a point -and one of the positive obligations of its participants is to stick to the point.
That a conversation contrasts with a chat in having a point is important in particular for understanding that complex, multistranded conversation which we call "natural science". Rorty makes much of the discoveries of Kuhn and Feyerabend -that theory-change has a "revolutionary" char-acter and that a superceded theory and its successors are logically "incommensurable" -and, indeed, there is much to be learned from these valuable insights, properly understood. But a proper understanding of "scientific revolutions" and "theoretical incommensurability" precisely requires a prior appreciation of the point of the conversation called "natural science", of the goals or aims of scientific inquiry, and on that count, I think, Rorty's own reflections are largely deficient.
I have discussed these matters at considerable length elsewhere (in Rosenberg 1980b, especially Chapter VIII, and in Rosenberg 1980a), and it is not my intention here to attempt to recapitulate everything which I have said on those other occasions. The central observation, however, is that scientific inquiry aims at "knowledge" in the Aristotelian sense: not merely the ability to say correctly what is, but to say correctly of what is why it is what it is. The point of the conversation called "natural science", in other words, is to equip its human participants with the ability to give correct explanatory accounts of aspects of their world.
The phrase "human participants" is intentional, for it is important to recognize that the conversation called "natural science" has a "third partner", an extra participant, whose contributions the other participants ignore precisely on pain of abandoning the very point of their conversation. This "third partner", of course, is "the world" (or "nature") itself, and its contributions are precisely the phenomena which the explanatory conversations of natural science are about, the "appearances" to be "saved", or, to put it less metaphorically, that which is to be explained.
The remarks of this "third partner" have a certain stubborn intransigence. We find ourselves with experiences -and, in an important sense, we are stuck with them. When Galileo peered through his crude telescope and noted the phases of Venus, something was interjected into the explanatory scientific conversation from which it could henceforth never pry itself loose, the obligation to explain what Galileo observed ... or thought he observed.
The reservation which I have appended to my last remark strikes at the heart of the matter. "Appearance" and "illusion" are themselves explanatory categories. Rorty lays great stress on the "situatedness" of all our affirmations (as Polanyi or Merleau-Ponty might call it), that is, on the fact that there is no "neutral" or "privileged" place to stand from which we can, so to speak, "non-committally" describe or characterize what it is that we then undertake to explain. Any description of an ostensible phenomenon must be framed in terms of the resources of some determinate "theory-laden" language -a language, that is, which already embodies an implicit system of explanations which, by adopting it for our descriptions, we eo ipso already implicitly endorse. That, indeed, is the crux of the Kuhnian and Feyerabendian insights concerning "revolutions" and "incommensurability", and a consequent insistence on our "situatedness" is, I think, both quite in order and quite correct. I certainly do not wish to be interpreted as setting myself in opposition to it.
I would also insist, however, that the fact that we cannot say what it is that we undertake to explain without tacitly endorsing some determinate explanation of it does not imply that there is nothing "objective" to be explained. From the fact that we cannot say what is "given" without first somehow "taking" it, in other words, it does not follow that nothing is "given" at all.
Galileo peered through his crude telescope and saw -or thought he saw -·the planet Venus wax and wane. At that moment, certain roads became closed to us. Thenceforth, to the extent that we remained participants in the conversation called "natural science" at all, we were obligated to explain a waxing and waning, to explain the phases of Venus. In the end, of course, we could explain them as real, or as merely apparent, or even as only Galileo's idiosyncratic, private illusions of a waxing and waning. These options all lay within the scope of our choices. Deciding among them, indeed, is what "scientific inquiry" is crucially about. But there was also something here which lay outside the scope of those choices, something which admitted of being "taken" as real or as mere appearance or even as illusion, but which, for all that interpretive latitude, was absolutely intransigent in its demands on us. It was imposed on us. It was, so to speak, a "remark" in the face of ~hich our conversation had henceforth to proceed.
The point of that conversation is precisely to "come to terms" with such "remarks", that is, non-arbitrarily to arrive at a categorial, explanatory description of what is, in this way, as it were, "a-categorially given" -to explain, and thereby to accommodate, the conversational contributions of our inescapable "third partner". What follows from this in the end, although the story is a long one, is that "scientific revolutions" are not the consequences of "arbitrary" socio-cultural forces and that "incommensurable theories" are not, for all their "incommensurability", immune to rational comparison and evaluation. A "scientific revolution", despite its radical and holistic character, is still accountable to something -and no such "revolution" which is not responsive to our "explanatory grievances" vis-a-vis the theory which it displaces can ultimately succeed, any more than a political revolution which neglects the grievances of its citizenry vis-a-vis the government which it proposes to overthrow can, in the end, be lastingly consumated.
Like the "mirroring" idiom against which Rorty sets himself, his own "conversational" idiom, which I have adopted (somewhat fancifully, to be sure) in these last remarks about explanation and theories, is at ground metaphorical. Any such idiom needs, in a certain sense, to be "demythologized" -and I have indeed attempted to supply less-fanciful versions of my own main substantive points elsewhere (in the works which I have already cited above).
Rorty may well be right in his insistence that it is high time for us once and for all to "demythologize" the metaphor of mirroring as well, to "purge philosophy of its mirror-imagery". Any such metaphor indeed carries its own risks of confusion. Whether or not the matter is as urgent as Rorty makes it out to be depends, I think, on one's reading of the history of philosophy and of the current scene -on one's judgment as to how pernicious the mirror metaphor in fact has been and one's sense of the extent to which such "ocular" thinking remains a dominant and persistent influence upon our current practices.
These, of course, are questions over which reasonable people can and will differ. While the issue is one which demands a far more detailed discussion that I can hope to give it here, it is, I think, in place for me to say that I am not inclined to share Rorty's sense of urgency. In particular, I am convinced that Rorty -and not just Rorty -underestimates the extent to which Kant already successfully pointed the way past the chief snares and pitfalls both of Cartesianism and of the tacit Concept Empiricist presuppositions shared by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. · Rorty's own reading of Kant appears to be fairly traditional. It is in any event, I would argue, mistaken in just the ways that many traditional readings of Kant tend to be mistaken. Rorty's explicit discussion of Kant (Rorty 1979, 148-55 ) is unfortunately very compressed. His chief critical accusation, however, is clear enough. It is that Kant "confused" predication with synthesis. Rorty arrives at this conclusion by focusing on Kant's distinction between "intuitions" (Anschauungen) and "concepts" (Begriffe), and by interpreting the Kantian notion of an intuition as continuous with Hume's "impressions", themselves regarde~ as "singular presentations to sense" -a phrase which Rorty evidently reads (since he identifies it with the first pole of C.I.Lewis' distinction between "immediate data" and "form, construction, or interpretation") as roughly equivalent to the twentieth century's "sense data".
While it must be admitted that Kant was not always as clear about "intuitions" as he should have been (especially in A), Rorty's interpretation of "Anschauungen" nevertheless arguably overlooks precisely Kant's major advance on the CartesianLockean tradition -his sharp distinction between "sensations" (Empfindungen) and "cognitions" (Erkenntnisse).
On Kant's considered view, intuitions are a species of cognitions; sensations are not. (A320=B376-7) What Rorty parses as Kant's "confusion" of synthesis and predication turns out, in fact, to be an essential Kantian thesis, one which Kant brings critically to bear on the failure of his predecessors to distinguish between non-cognitive "sensations" and singular "intuitions" which, to put Kant's point in a contemporary idiom, already exhibit "logical form" (that is, the "forms of judgment"). Kant's point, adopting Rorty's terminology, is precisely that there can be no synthesis -and therefore no consciousness -without "predication". "The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition ••• " (A79=B104-5) The "sense-datist" notion of a pre-conceptual or non-cognitive "given" which is at the same time "experience"-i.e., something of which one is or can be conscious -is not, as Rorty appears to suppose, an idea which Kant embraces but, on the contrary, one which Kant is centrally concerned to oppose.
Not, of course, that Kant's own positive picture is free from significant problems. Chief among them, as Hegel already pointed out, is the complete absence of any developed theory of social reality, and Kant's consequent inability to distinguishing between a concept's not being "acquired from experience" (in the Humean, inductive sense) and its being somehow innate. The picture of "innate faculties" does, indeed, need to be abandoned -in favor of an account which recognizes precisely that "to have a mastery of concepts is to be able to use a language", and that such languages are themselves "acquired", although not by applying the operations of a "mental chemistry" to the raw materials of "impressions".
Be that as it may, however, it ought to be clear enough that Kant was not simply another uncritical expositor of the metaphor of mirroring. His concern, indeed, was precisely to deny that we come to know the world through being passively "impressed" by it, and instead to stress our own activity in "constructing" or "constituting" the objects of our categorial experience. While "constitution" may, to be sure, be no less a metaphor than "mirroring", it is at least a different metaphor -and one which is continuous with such contemporary views as "that 'knowledge of' presupposes 'knowledge that'" and "all seeing is seeing as" (as well as with central claims of contemporary physiological and cognitive psychology, e.g., that sensory systems act as "filters" and "pre-processors" rather than as neutral "transmitters" of external stimuli) in a way in which the "ocular" metaphor of mirroring obviously is not.
There would also be some justice, however, in the claim that the most a philosopher can ever hope to do is to proceed in this way from one metaphor to another. We must, after all, in the end grant Rorty his insistence that there is not "privileged" or "neutral" place for us to stand, outside of all historical contingencies, in order to attain the synoptic and reflective survey and appraisal of our own rational practices which, I would continue to maintain, remains the proper goal and mission of the discipline of philosophy. Any such global self-understanding and self-appraisal can only be conducted, so to speak, "from within", by adapting the descriptive and explanatory resources of our current time-bound culture to such wider aims. Rorty is surely wrong about his larger claim -that "philosophy" names nothing but a persistent historical disposition to succumb to such confusions and its lingering contemporary residue in the interdepartmental political revalries of the Academy. I would, in contrast, vigorously argue that "philosophy" instead names a distinctive intellectual mission within any reflective culture worthy of the name, a necessary project of synoptic self-understanding and self-appraisal, the legitimacy of which survives our acknowledgment of the contingencies, limitations, and inadequacies of any of its concrete, time-bound instantiations.
When I began the project of composing this response to Rorty's challenges,. I was torn between an inclination to say a great deal and a strong temptation to say nothing at all. As it is, I have in fact written rather more than I originally expected to -but far less than I. now see that I could. Rorty aligns himself with those whom he counts among the great "edifying" philosophers -Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, the later Wittgenstein and the later Heidegger. Such philosophers, he says, are "reactive".
"They know their work loses its point when the period they were reacting against is over. They are intentionally peripheral." (Rorty 1979, 369) What explains my temptation to say nothing at all is my feeling that perhaps the period against which Rorty himself is reacting is over. His sketch of "Philosophy in America Today" is, to be sure, a likeness -but in the way in which a caricature is a likeness, not a photograph. Presented with a caricature of oneself, one may react in two ways. One can protest heatedly against the distortions; or one can chuckle and nod-and then get back to business. In this essay, I have registered what I hope is a mild protest against Rorty's distortions. But a chuckle and a nod are surely equally among his due. The role of gadfly is, of course, also a time-honored one within philosophy, and Rorty has played it well. But now, I think, it is high time for us to stop chatting about our
